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The question of visibility and invisibility in social understanding is examined here. First, the
phenomenological account of expressive phenomena and key ideas of the participatory
sense-making theory are presented with regard to the issue of visibility. These accounts
plead for the principal visibility of agents in interaction. Although participatory sense-
making does not completely rule out the existence of opacity and invisible aspects of
agents in interaction, it assumes the capacity of agents to integrate disruptions, opacity
and misunderstandings in mutual modulation. Invisibility is classiﬁed as the dialectical
counterpart of visibility, i.e., as a lack of sense whereby the dynamics of perpetual asking,
of coping with each other and of improvements in interpretation are brought into play. By
means of empirical exempliﬁcation this article aims at demonstrating aspects of invisibility
in social interaction which complement the enactive interpretation.Without falling back into
Cartesianism, it shows through dramaturgical analysis of a practice called “(Inter)acting
with the inner partner” that social interaction includes elements of opacity and invisibility
whose role is performative.This means that opacity is neither an obstacle to be overcome
with more precise understanding nor a lack of meaning, but rather an excess of sense, a
“hiddenness” of something real that has an “active power” (Merleau-Ponty). In this way it
contributes to on-going social understanding as a hidden potentiality that naturally enriches,
ampliﬁes and in part constitutes human participation in social interactions. It is also shown
here that this invisible excess of sense already functions on the level of self-relationship
due to the essential self-opacity and self-alterity of each agent of social interaction. The
analysis consequently raises two issues: the question of the enactive ethical stance toward
the alterity of the other and the question of the autonomy of the self-opaque agent.
Keywords: participatory sense-making, enactive theory, Merleau-Ponty, invisibility, opacity, (Inter)acting with the
inner partner, performativity, dramaturgical analysis
INTRODUCTION
Starting from a basic agreement with key ideas of enactive theory
of social understanding, especially with the concept of partici-
patory sense-making, this paper presents a detailed examination
of the question of visibility and invisibility of agents in social
interaction. In order to avoid Cartesian homuncularity, enactive
theory pleads for the principal visibility of agents, the a priori
given tendency to understand each other, and their capacity to
integrate disruptions, opacity and misunderstandings in mutual
modulation. While it does not fully deny opacity and invisible
aspects of agents in interaction, it regards these as the dialecti-
cal counterpart of visibility, as a lack of sense that brings about
the dynamics of social understanding in the form of asking, of
coping with each other, and of improving interpretations. The
aim of this article is to focus on an aspect of invisibility in social
interaction that complements the enactive interpretation. With-
out lapsing into Cartesianism, I wish to exemplify several levels
of invisibility in social interaction (physical, social, self-relational,
and intersubjective). In particular, I wish to analyze a hypothesis
according to which there is an aspect of invisibility that func-
tions as a subtle source of ungraspable meaning, as an excess of
sense, whose function is performative. This aspect, I argue, con-
tributes to on-going social understanding as a hidden potentiality
that naturally enriches, ampliﬁes and in part constitutes human
participation in social interactions. As the second part of the
research I wish to draw upon experimental work to make it
clear that an agent’s invisibility (opacity) is present already in
the self-relationship and grounds the non-trivial structure of
self-alterity.
I wish to demonstrate these aspects of social understanding on
the basis of qualitative research accomplished within longitudinal
studies of theatricality, performativity, and art-based practices at
the Institute for Research and Study of Authorial Acting (IRSAA),
at the Academy of Performing Arts in Prague and the Academy of
Sciences of the Czech Republic. The research limits itself only to
one experiment called “(Inter)acting with the inner partner” and
its potential to exemplify self-alterity and the invisible excess of
sense. Methodologically I mainly draw upon the research of the
sociologist Goffman (1956) and his dramaturgical analysis (see
alsoHare andBlumberg, 1988), but important tools for the present
study are also the examination of symbolic interaction in everyday
life, the phenomenological method and participatory observation.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The problem of social cognition has been one of the most burning
issues in psychology and cognitive science over the last several
decades. The original “problem of other minds” that presup-
poses the existence of hidden mental, interior and private space
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represented secondarily through different linguistic, corporeal,
and gestural manifestations has been widely criticized. The cri-
tique arose in phenomenological philosophy and has undergone
further elaboration and development in the theory of embodied
and enactive cognition.
As regards the phenomenological response to the problem of
other minds, already in Scheler (1973 [1912], 232–234) proposed
the concept of expressive unity (Ausdruckseinheit). He attempted
to show that expression (corporeal behavior, action, gestures,
discursive articulation) is not only a secondary visible manifes-
tation of a psyche, but at least an integral part thereof. This
statement is further developed by many other authors. Plessner
(2003 [1941], 261) says that the unity of an expressive phe-
nomenon is given by “indifference between content and form,”
as is evident in the case of primary intersubjective expressive phe-
nomena, such as laughter or crying, where the sign and meaning
cannot be linked together arbitrarily. We may refer as well to Mau-
rice Merleau-Ponty who assumes: “We must reject the prejudice
which makes ‘inner realities’ out of love, hate or anger, leav-
ing them accessible to one single witness: the person who feels
them. Anger, shame, hate, and love are not psychic facts hid-
den at the bottom of another’s consciousness: they are types of
behavior or styles of conduct which are visible from the outside.
They exist on this face or in those gestures, not hidden behind
them”(Merleau-Ponty,1964a, 52–53). In thiswayphenomenology
assumes that social cognition has to do with perception (aisthesis)
and that a human being is in principle “visible” to other human
beings.
The enactive theory of embodied cognition moves in a sim-
ilar direction. It attempts to overcome Cartesianism and its
third-person paradigm of social cognition understood as a pas-
sive observation of others’ behavior. As many have shown
(Varela et al., 1991; Thompson and Varela, 2001; Gallagher and
Varela, 2003; Thompson, 2007; Hutto, 2013; Hutto and Myin,
2013) the mind cannot be reduced to brain processes or inter-
nal representations, but is “an ongoing and situated activity”
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, 486). This entails that social
understanding should be understood as “an interactional and
intercorporeal process in which both partners are immersed
and in which the process of interacting itself plays a lead-
ing role for the understanding. . . In short: social cognition
emerges from embodied social interaction or, in Merleau-Ponty’s
term, from intercorporeality” (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009,
469).
This familiar context is important for the purpose of this paper
in one particular respect, namely as regards the principal visibility
of other minds. The enactive theory opposes the Theory Theory
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978; Baron-Cohen et al., 1986; Antoni-
etti et al., 2006) and the Simulation Theory (Gordon, 1996; Dokic
and Proust, 2002; Goldman, 2006) that share the common presup-
position of “homuncularity, the absence of body” (De Jaegher and
Di Paolo, 2007, 485), in other words the idea that “[human beings]
are hidden from each other in principle” (Fuchs and De Jaegher,
2009, 467). Enactivism explains this presupposition of the Theory
Theory and the Simulation Theory by the fact that they both stem
from Cartesian dualism. In accordance with phenomenological
approaches mentioned above, the theory of enaction operates on
the assumption that agents’ actions can be understood“as exhibit-
ing an inherent and ‘visible’ intentionality and as being related to
each other in a meaningful way” (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009,
467). This is possible due to the fact that the very substance
of what one means in interaction is always embodied. “Bodily
expression does not mean a simple subsequent externalization of
what already is inside me, but rather expression is a realization of
sense” (Waldenfels, 2000, 222); “For the enactivist the body is the
ultimate source of signiﬁcance; embodiment means that mind is
inherent in the precarious, active... process of animation. . . Cog-
nition simply cannot but be embodied” (Di Paolo et al., 2010, 42).
The mutual visibility of agents is explicated by the genealogy of
social understanding that has a ﬁrm basis in intercorporeality.
The genealogy points to basic empathy as developed in the ﬁrst
month of human life on the basis of perpetual corporeal interac-
tion between the child and her most intimate caregivers (Tronick
et al., 1979; Murray and Trevarthen, 1985; Kelso, 1995). This rela-
tionship is based on “trust in others and bonding capacity,” where
“mismatches,” i.e., “interactive errors” are followed “with quick
reparations”and reparation becomes a key process of social under-
standing (Fuchs and De Jaegher, 2009, 479). This leads directly to
the primacy of visibility that is potentially able to integrate invisibil-
ity, disruption, and misunderstanding: “interactional experience
continually increases the skillfulness of the participants. . .This is
based on the ‘visibility’ of intentions-in-action” (Fuchs and De
Jaegher, 2009, 471). Visibility is further reinforced by the phenom-
ena of “coordination” as a “ubiquitous phenomenon in physical
and biological systems” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, 490) and
“mutual modulation” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, 504) that
both play a crucial role in the generation of meaning called “par-
ticipatory sense-making” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007). The
expressive phenomenon is understood as a unity that is fully at
stake in the process of mutual understanding.
Obviously, enactive theory does not fully deny the relevance of
opacity for social interaction and understanding. Such an inter-
pretation would be false and misleading. There are basically two
strategies for dealing with the opacity or alterity of the other in
social interaction. The ﬁrst emphasizes the radical alterity and
non-transparency of the other (e.g., Lévinas, 1979, 89, Theory
Theory, Simulation Theory). However, as Zahavi (2005, 175)
mentions, “the difﬁculty with this view is that it often tends
to emphasize the transcendence and elusiveness of the other to
such extent that it not only denies the existence of a functioning
intersubjectivity, but also the a priori status of intersubjectivity.”
This is indeed the reason why the enactive theory rejects such an
approach. The second strategy tends to see opacity as a relevant
aspect of the shared process of coping and social understanding
(e.g., Husserl on interplay between ipseity and alterity: Hua 8/62;
14/457; 13/263). This perspective characterizes the participatory
sense-making approach aswell. It is basedon the assumptionof the
primary visibility of the other, as I mentioned above. On this view,
the other is never “totally alien” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007,
504). Because the other appears due to “my own participation in
the emergence and breakdown of joint relational sense-making”
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, 504), we cannot be completely
alien to each other. Authors say that agents taking part in interac-
tion do not “experience the other-in-interaction as totally obscure
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and inaccessible, nor as fully transparent, but. . . as protean pattern
with knowable and unknowable surfaces and angles” (De Jaegher
and Di Paolo, 2007, 504). However, the basic unity of the shared
process enables“mutual modulation”and makes visible within the
process of social interaction only those aspects thatmake sense to me
as a participant. It is a continual process where misunderstandings
as the “dialectical counterpart of understanding” serve the initia-
tion of the process and its continuation“like questions that lead to
answers in the subsequent course of the interaction” (Fuchs and
De Jaegher, 2009, 471). The assumption of the primary visibility
of the other, the phenomenon of mutual modulation and coordi-
nation may be seen as characteristics of the primary readiness and
tendency to understand the other, to interpret her as meaningful.
FORMULATION OF SPECIFIC FOCUS OF THE STUDY: THE INVISIBLE
EXCESS OF SENSE
Principally in agreementwith this way of interpreting social cogni-
tion, I wish nevertheless to focus in some detail on one particular
and rather subtle aspect of invisibility. I hope that taking this
phenomenon into consideration will enable us to uncover a new
dimension of opacity in social interaction besides radical hidden
transcendence (the absolute form of the intangibility of the other).
First of all, I wish to follow Zahavi’s (2005, 175) assumption that
“the encounter with the other is, in any way, prepared and condi-
tioned by an alterity internal to the self.” I wish to demonstrate on
the basis of my experimental study that there is a “form of alterity
internal to the embodied self,” that self-experience of subjectivity
must contain a dimension of otherness and that intersubjectivity
would otherwise be impossible (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, 400–
401; Zahavi, 2005, 158). Secondly, I wish to demonstrate that
this otherness is not only a dialectical counterpart of our unity,
not only a lack of sense that calls for fulﬁllment or a question
that calls for an answer, but it is rather a performative aspect
of our existence that can obtain only as invisible and can con-
tribute to social interaction only if we let it run its course. In other
words, there is an aspect of invisibility that contributes to social
interaction and represents something that makes sense in social
interaction, although it is not within the agent’s reach and com-
prehension. This is why I call this aspect the invisible excess of
sense.
To demonstrate this sort of phenomenon and to support my
thesis Iwish to refer brieﬂy toMerleau-Ponty’s descriptionof opac-
ity in two layers, one corporeal and one cognitive. First of all, he
emphasizes that visibility is, already on the corporeal level, given
under the condition of non-transparency, invisibility. Human
beings are visible, because they are not transparent. In otherwords,
one can be visible to somebody if one is invisible in some respect, if
one gives resistance to perception. As Merleau-Ponty (1964b, 167)
put it: “Experience is. . . contact of ﬁnite subject with impenetra-
ble being. . . the ﬂesh of what is perceived, this compact particle. . .
stops exploration.” Thus, the condition of the possibility of the
visibility of the other seems to be not the willingness to be visible,
but rather the resistance to the viewof the other. The hiddenness of
perceived being is given in the density, the thickness of materiality
which impedes any further seizing hold of it. Merleau-Ponty urges
us not to seize hold of the real, but to become accustomed to its
mystery, hiddenness – to its “being in withdrawal.” He warns that
as soon as we create our possibilities, goals or ideas out of the real,
we lose sight of a certain layer of things, a layer of inexhaustible
riches opened to our gaze.
As regards the “cognitive” layer, Merleau-Ponty (1968, 150)
speaks of ideas that can exist only in a hidden way: “It is as though
the secrecy wherein they lie... were their proper mode of exis-
tence.” By this Merleau-Ponty does not mean to say that these
ideas are abstract and invisible, pure, and intangible. He points
out that their visibility is necessarily covered and they can exist
only in a covered way: “there is no vision without the screen: the
ideas we are speaking of would not be better known to us if we
had no body and no sensibility; . . . [they] are not exhausted by
their manifestations.”Merleau-Ponty thus reminds us of the com-
plex relationship between the visible (perceptible) and invisible
aspects of meaning. He states that there are “ideas” whose exis-
tence is necessarily embodied although this embodiment makes
them unavoidably opaque. There is nothing like an abstract idea
transformed subsequently into a sign graspable by the receiver.
These ideas can exist only as hidden and never complete in their
manifestation. Their being is embodied, but their meaning is not
totally given by perceptible signs. It is uniquely this invisibility
which gives them their performing power, their authority in the
shared perceptible world. “It is that they owe their authority, their
fascinating, indestructible power precisely to the fact that they are
in transparency behind the sensible” (Merleau-Ponty, 1968, 150).
We should understand from this that visible meaning is some-
times accompanied by the invisible aspect that ampliﬁes the“active
power” of what is being perceived. Thanks to their opacity ideas
address the receivers, provoke them to action, and move them.
They are performative. This view is not restricted to the thought
of Merleau-Ponty. Ricouer (2000, 337), for instance, mentions the
existence of the unsiginiﬁable element in human experience that
is a source of meaning without ever being addressed.
METHODOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
As I have already mentioned, the existence of the invisible excess
of sense and the inner duality based on irreducible self-difference
and self-opacity of the agent are to be shown through experimental
investigation using art-based practices and methods of qualitative
research.
The art-based and theater-based inspirations for the study of
social interactions have a long-standing tradition in academic
research. The wider context of the presented research can be
seen in the work of the following researchers and their con-
ceptions: the dramaturgical analysis of symbolic interaction in
everyday life of the sociologist Goffman (1956; see also Hare and
Blumberg, 1988); Berne’s (1964) transactional analysis inspired
by theater practice and his view on games we all play in social
interaction; sociodrama, sociometry, and psychodrama in the
work of Moreno and Moreno (1975a,b, 1983) the anthropolog-
ical account based on theater metaphors given by Blumenberg
(1989); and the ontology of play developed by Fink (1960, 2012).
If we understand individuals as agents or actors, then social
interactions can be viewed as dramatic productions. The res-
onances and conﬂicts in social interaction, reﬂecting processes
and pathologies, role play, the issue of visibility and invisibil-
ity of an individual to the other, the exposure of the actor to
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the public, the relationship between labor and entertainment,
and inter-corporeality in social relations are studied in this con-
text by means of thoroughly examining the agent’s experience on
stage.
“(INTER)ACTING WITH THE INNER PARTNER.” SETTING
My analysis is meant as a modest contribution to this scope
of investigation. It focuses on one experiment which concerns
a detailed study of self-interaction and social interaction in an
empty space (stage) under special conditions. The experiment
“(Inter)acting with the inner partner” is being developed by Ivan
Vyskocˇil, Czech psychologist, pedagogue, philosopher, playwright
and writer and it has been practiced at the Academy of Performing
Arts in Prague for the last 20 years (Groenewald, 2004).
The practice is organized in the form of semester courses
(September–January, February–June) for the general public, i.e.,
for people who take the course out of their own interest. Each
year there are approximately 10 parallel courses of the practice.
Participants are of different age, afﬁliation, gender, nationality,
and professional background. The initial motivations of partic-
ipants differ. Among them are curiosity based on the renown
of the practice and author, self-knowledge and self-development,
and artistic inclination. “(Inter)acting with the inner partner” is
not a method focused uniquely on the training of future actors,
but it provides interested people with the capacity to act openly
in front of other people and to develop their consciousness of
body, mind, and action. The experiment takes place in sessions.
Each session lasts an hour and a half and is organized once a
week for a minimum of 4 months. The signiﬁcant effect of the
experiment, however, is usually achieved after about a year of
rehearsal. The group of participants is closed, their number being
limited to 15. The session is led by one or two leaders, profes-
sionals with extensive experience in both the practice itself and
taking a leadership role in it. The sessions take part in a bright
and empty classroom with a high ceiling, empty space (stage),
and the appropriate number of seats. The Academy of Performing
Arts guarantees the ethical approval of the practice: the exper-
iment is fully voluntary. If a participant concludes after several
sessions that she does not wish to continue, she may choose to
stay in the group without practicing or simply to leave. However,
this case is extremely rare in spite of the fact that the practice is
sometimes frustrating, especially in its initial phase. The favorable
atmosphere helps people concentrate on what can be gained from
the practice.
DESCRIPTION
The experiment consists in entering the empty space (stage), to
be seen by other participants, and experimenting there for a time
ranging from 2 to 5 min. The experimenting participant is thus
alone in a ﬁeld of the onlookers’ attention without any aids (e.g.,
music, props, costume). She is given no task in advance, no role to
play, no object to deal with. She appears in a situation of so-called
“public solitude.” Public solitude is understood as a situation in
which the participant does not contact the spectators in any way,
especially visually or physically. It is “as if” they were not present.
The spectators, however, are not fully detached observers. They are
encouraged to support the actor with “favorable attention” which
means that there is no loss of intersubjectivity despite the lack of
discursive and direct eye contact.
The participant is encouraged within this time-frame to “go
out of oneself,” “express oneself in a sufﬁciently intense way” and
to “come back toward oneself” through voice, body expression
and speech (Vyskocˇil, 2005, 4)1. This means that the performer
expresses herself in such a way that this expression attains
some sort of autonomy – it becomes a meaningful “ﬁgure” (i.e.,
autonomous unequivocal expression) in space and time that can
be addressed back to the performer andmake her react as someone
else.
Each individual trial is terminated after the pre-set time period
by means of an auditory signal. The participant joins her seated
colleagues and discusses observations and comments about what
she did in the spacewhen exactly“intense”momentswith potential
for acting appeared, by which condition the action could proceed,
what exactly blocked the action, how the psychosomatic balance or
disorder affected her capacity to be present in the situation, in front
of other people, etc. The discussion is facilitated by the leader who
usually gives most of the comments. After the discussion, another
participant volunteers to go into the empty space and practice.
There are usually two or three rounds for each participant during
the session. Participants are encouraged to note and articulate
their experience, discoveries, observations, and ideas in the form
of regular written reﬂections that enable them to ﬁx key moments
in the development of the process.
DATA GATHERING
The practice has been thoroughly developed and studied with
respect to many features (self-consciousness, creativity, com-
munication skills, psychological effects, group dynamics, etc.).
The research is developed at the IRSAA (https://www.damu.
cz/cs/umeni-veda-vyzkum/ustavy/ustav-pro-vyzkum-a-studium-
autorskeho-herectvi) at theAcademyof PerformingArts inPrague.
The institute provides systematic data gathering and outcome-
analysis of thementionedpractice (Vyskocˇil, 2005; Slavíková,2009;
Suda, 2009; Chrz, 2010a,b,c). The data gathered since 1995 up to
this moment consist in:
(1) 1200 video records of rehearsals of participants and com-
ments of prospective leaders dated from 1995 to 2014, assorted
according to the individuals (enabling to study the genealogy
of their development in the practice), codiﬁed and accessible in
theArchive of the IRSAA,Academyof PerformingArts, Prague,
Czech Republic.
(2) 1600 written reﬂections given by participants (hand written
or digital) and leaders of the sessions – self-reﬂective notes of
the key moments of their practice and observations, codiﬁed,
1In order to emphasize and support this capacity, the leader of the session asks the
participants at the outset to bring to mind, for the sake of guidance, the experience
of being with oneself in interaction, talking to oneself, playing by oneself in pure
solitude. It usually happens when we are alone and either face an issue (as we
make a decision and hesitate, as we remember an embarrassing situation) or we are
bored or relaxed (making faces in the mirror during a long elevator ride, singing,
and narrating in the bathroom). Such basic living situations already show a certain
non-trivial interactive self-relationship of human being in moments of emptiness,
lacking any explicit interaction with other objects or subjects. The question is: what
happens if this playful interaction with oneself as another is induced in front of the
others?
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assorted, and accessible in the Archive of the IRSAA, Academy
of Performing Arts, Prague, Czech Republic.
(3) Interviews with Ivan Vyskocˇil explaining the main principles
of the respective practice, some of which are available online at
http://www.ivanvyskocil.cz/, or http://www.interactingwiththe
innerpartner.org/Downloads_&_Links_ﬁles/A%20Discussion
%20with%20Ivan%20Vyskocil%20about%20IwIP.pdf, codi-
ﬁed and accessible in the Archive of IRSAA, Academy of
Performing Arts, Prague, Czech Republic.
Data used for presented study
The results I wish to present in this paper are based on my partici-
patory observation and dramaturgical analysis of one closed group
that assembled from September 2012 to June 2013. There were in
total 36 sessions, each lasting an hour and a half. The particular
group consisted in 15 participants (six men, nine women), 10 of
them 20–30 years old, 3 of them 30–40 years old, and 2 of them
40–55 years old. Seven participants were university students of
philosophy, two IT professionals, two students of authorial acting,
one unemployed, one professional translator (Czech-Japanese),
one professional anthropologist, one on maternity leave. Data I
used for investigating the main idea of this paper consisted in:
(1) 30 written reﬂections made by participants (hand written
or digital) of the sessions – self-reﬂective notes of the key
moments of their practice and observations.
(2) Field notes taken from the position of a participating observer,
on the basis of interviews and collective discussions with other
participants.
(3) Additional experience accumulated and recorded on the
methodological basis of participatory observation made
throughout my engagement for 11 years in the exercise as
participant and leader.
RESEARCH METHODS
For investigation of “(Inter)acting with the inner partner” I used
the following methodology: dramaturgical analysis, participatory
observation, and the phenomenological approach.
In accordancewith dramaturgical analysis of Goffman, I under-
stoodparticipants as performers of a dramatic situationpresenting
themselves at the beginning of the practice “as such and such” in
order to satisfy or resist the cultural norms, values and expec-
tations (Bochner, 2001; Spry, 2001; Jago, 2002). “(Inter)acting
with the inner partner” is explained by Vyskocˇil (1981) as a
“laboratory of (inter)action in dramatic situation.” This con-
vergence enables me to use dramaturgical analysis as a method
of investigation of how identities, values, meanings, opacity,
and relations are in detail constituted and executed in the sta-
ble conditions and protocols of the practice described in chap.
“Description.” These features were studied with participatory
observation and observation of participation (Malinowski, 1922;
Firth, 1985; Tedlock, 1991, 2000; Clough, 1992). I made use of
the following: direct observation as a member of the audience,
participatory observation during informal meetings with other
participants, in collective discussions about the practice, analy-
ses of personal text reﬂections written by participants, narratives
on development, and transformation of other members of the
group.
For participants, the phenomenological contribution to this
methodology was very important. The setting of public solitude
enables them to adopt Husserl’s idea of epoché (for relevance
of this method see, Moustakas, 1994; Sadala and Adorno, 2001;
Groenewald, 2004). Epoché means bracketing (withdrawing from
personal consideration, Groenewald, 2004, 50) the direct inten-
tional reliance of the participant on other subjects and objects
of the world. This bracketing concerns “pre-given coordination”
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, 495), obvious ways of being and
thinking in public through coded, normative ways of interaction.
Participants were made aware of the fact that the practice enables
them to distance themselves from their automatic coded forms of
performance in the public world, to become conscious of this way
of acting in public and to study structures of their action without
abandoning action as such (Creswell, 1998, 54 and 113;Moustakas,
1994, 90).
RESULTS
In this section I describe results of participatory observation for
1 year and dramaturgical analysis of a group of beginners, as
described in Section “Data Used for Presented Study.” As I men-
tioned in Introduction, my research (inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s
ideas) was focused on:
(1) the exempliﬁcation of the structure of self-alterity of the agent
that is constitutive for action and social interaction,
(2) the hypothesis of the existence of an invisible excess of sense
in social interaction that has a performative function.
Due to the fact that the effect of the practice is not only cognitive
but also transformative and develops in the course of time, the
observations concerning the research at issue changed signiﬁcantly
with the number of sessions. For this reason I decided to divide
the description of observations into stages.
UNCANNY CHAOS
The situation of being visible for others without any task to per-
form and without any a priori given role represents the initial
period of the practice. This period typically lasts between 6 and
10 sessions. It is usually described by participants as a situation
of the deepest confusion, chaos, uncanny experience, frustration,
embarrassment, fear, anxiety, threatening exposure, and empti-
ness. As personal notes of participants and interviews document
this situation, the negative emotions, according to actors, stem
from the fact that they cannot use their obvious codiﬁed way
of social behavior. One participant writes: “When I appeared
in the space, I couldnot identify myself with anything partic-
ular. I was nobody suddenly. It was unbearable.” The others
add: “What is the most embarrassing is that I cannot use my
usual tricks,” “There is no where to hide, I am like inﬁnitely
exposed.” The function of social roles becomes evident in the
following commentaries: “If I should not have a role, I do not
know what the others want from me.” “I do not feel safe if there
is no role for me.” Participants agree that they do not know
who they are if there is not the “pre-given coordination,” coded
game of roles, the possibility of being visible “as this and this” –
as a clever guy, beautiful lady, rebel, bored intellectual, engaged
socialist.
www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1081 | 5
Koubová Invisible excess of sense in social interaction
The participants react to this situation during the initial
experiments with a chaotic “overtension,” expressed in unlimited
speaking, chaotic moving on the scene, ﬁghting with the situation,
or on the other hand, with a very remarkable “undertension,” loss
of effort, depressive behavior and physical resignation, ﬂight and
freezing. Written participants’ notes document this feature again.
A young participant explains:“When I ﬁrst tried the IwIP I stood in
the corner of the room and couldnot move, it was like I was stuck.”
The reaction of another agent was different: “I only was able to run
in the circles around the space faster and faster.” Participants had
quite liminal reactions as well: “My ﬁrst attempt looked like a very
intense training in martial art,” or “I just lay down on the ﬂoor and
hid my head in my arms. It was like an overwhelming ‘nothing’ all
around me.”
This state can be designatedwithVyskocˇil’s term“state of insen-
sibility,” a sort of trance following from obvious dependence of
individual on public expectations and ruled social interactions.
This very frustrating initial stage, however, does not discourage
participants from keeping practicing. Their curiosity is greater
than the negative feelings regarding the ﬁrst rehearsals. As they
comment on it: “It attracts me in spite of the fact that I do not
absolutely know what this can bring,”“There is something intrigu-
ing in it, I wish to ﬁnd it out,” “It looks like nonsense, but I kept
thinking of it the whole week. I am extremely nervous before each
trial but immediately after the session I wish to try it again.”
This stage of the experiment does not show much according
to our hypothesis that social interaction includes performative
elements of opacity and invisibility and that this invisible excess
of sense already functions on the level of self-relationship due to
the essential self-opacity and self-alterity of each agent of social
interaction. In terms of our hypothesis this stage of experiment is
preparatory. In spite of it, it shows important aspects of visibility
and invisibility in social interaction in agreementwith the enaction
theory:
(A) Action for a human being is always interaction. Being taken
away from lively interactions, one feels uncanny and empty,
powerless and “nobody.” This result validates the enaction
assumption that each agent is a center of activity in the world,
which means that the sense-making proceeds as enactment of
the world, active exchanges with the world that are inherently
signiﬁcant for the cognizer (De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007,
487–488). In case of the lack of these lively, historically accus-
tomed interactions with the world the precariousness of the
systems appears to be signiﬁcant. The isolation of the agent
from the network provokes extreme reactions (ﬁght, ﬂight,
freeze, exhaustion).
(B) The feeling of emptiness and stress when roles are taken
away conﬁrms Goffman’s assumption that agents embody
dramatic roles in social interaction, that they are using sta-
bilized normative system of communication as their way of
being “somebody” in public sphere. Being visible in social
interaction very oftenmeans identifyingoneself with an image
the agent wishes to expose in the interactions and being invis-
ible in another way (Blumenberg, 1989, 55). Chrz (2010a,
155) points out that this level of practice uncovers the “rigid
ego identiﬁed with the mask.”The social interaction proceeds
then as an interplay of coded roles, habitus (Bourdieu, 1990,
cit. op. De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, 495).
(C) It is important to notice that participants are attracted by
the practice despite the frustration it brings. The curiosity of
primarily frustrated participants is a testimony to the human
ability and even the will to cope with unobvious situations
beyond pre-given coordination (De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007, 495), to wish to act otherwise than in a pre-coded way.
PHYSICAL NON-TRANSPARENCY AS THE FIRST FORM OF INVISIBILITY
The next stage of the experiment arises after about six sessions
(1 month and half of practicing). At this stage participants slowly
allow themselves to calm down, to concentrate, to loosen up,
to perceive and to express themselves. In this period they very
often mix their tendency to imitate, copy, accept and produce
various prefabrications and standards in order to amuse the
observers, not to be silly in front of them, to escape from the
uncanny situation etc. with a sort of acknowledgment that they
are simply here as they are. Their physical presence seems to
be sufﬁcient for being visible. They become conscious of their
essential non-transparency, their resistance to the gaze of oth-
ers. As one participant says: “For so many weeks I have tried
to perform something interesting here, but I ﬁnally found this
always so stupid. So now I decided just to stand up in the cen-
ter of the room. I told myself: nobody can harm me, let them
watch if they want to. This is me. I was standing there for a
very long time. I felt like a rock, or statue, full of meaning
suddenly.”
The key observation in this stage consists in becoming aware
of oneself as of the other on the physical level. This is documented
by the following commentary: “I started touching myself with my
hand and explored the boundaries of my body, those of my face,
of my neck, of the other hand, of the back. It was like discovering
myself in the space, physically. I realized I was there as a body.
This calmed me down, it was sufﬁcient to be there and feel my
boundaries. I was there like this for the others as well.”
The awareness of self-alterity led sometimes even to creative
play: “It was for the ﬁrst time I really stopped focusing on what
the others think of me. I was uniquely interested in the way my
hand was moving around my body. It was like a small butterﬂy
touching me at different places. And at the moment I told myself
it was a butterﬂy, my hand was more and more like this and my
body changed into a ﬂower. It was amazing, I could just play
with it.” Another form of self-alterity was found through voice
communication: “I had a problem with my voice. I couldnot speak
loudly, I felt ashamed. But this time I told myself: well, the worst
thing that can happen is that I will be stupid before them as usual.
So I cried out loud and it really scared me. It was like the voice of
a stranger. But I cried back, telling it that he scared me and that he
should stop immediately. And the ﬁrst answered he couldnot stop
until I would calm down. And I answered I couldnot calm down
while he kept scaring me. And then he proposed to me that we
should cry together and show we are here. It was a sudden change
and even very amusing one. I completely forgot about the fear in
front of the audience and laughed a lot.”
These commentaries document already some aspects present
in the research hypothesis:
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(A) Already on the level of physical self-affection one realizes that
one relates to oneself as to another [the difference between me
and myself in the sentences “I touch myself as. . . (a body),”
“I can see myself as. . . (a butterﬂy),” “I hear myself as. . . (a
stranger)”]. This self-alterity causes the need to respond, to
act.
(B) Participants notice at this stage that their mere physical exis-
tence “makes sense” to them and to the audience without the
need to produce anything. Paradoxically, they make sense
because they are not transparent to themselves, because their
ﬂesh resists their own gaze and that of others. They can under-
stand themselves always only “as” something or somebody
else. They never say,“I am I,” they are not visible to themselves
as themselves, but always as something/somebody else. They
are always visible because they are invisible as a totality. They
are visible because they hide themselves at the same time to
the gaze of others in some respect. This is whatMerleau-Ponty
(1945/1962, 6) means by the concept of the indeterminate in
perception. Other terms Merleau-Ponty uses with respect to
this phenomenon are ambiguity, vagueness, or opaqueness.
He speaks as well of the mystery of the impenetrable ﬂesh
that has performing power. I cannot see “I,” I is invisible for
me as an “I.” The self-relationship contains difference and
indeterminacy, opacity, non-transparency, and this very fact
makes human being move and be alive. As soon as partic-
ipants became aware of their natural non-transparency and
thus meaningfulness they gained the power to act they had
previously been missing.
(C) Participants became aware of their non-transparency for
themselves together with their awareness of being non-
transparent for the others. Self-interaction and social inter-
action seem to arise together (without one being prior to
the other) from the experience of non-transparency, thus
self-opacity and the possibility to engage in a non-trivial
relationship.
BACK-STAGE AND FRONT-STAGE: SOCIAL INVISIBILITY
After approximately 10 sessions, a new stage of experimenta-
tion emerges. Participants feel sufﬁciently assured through their
physical resistance and being-in-relation with themselves through
physical contact so that they start to observe the duality of roles and
“non-coded behavior.”What comes to their mind very often at this
stage is the idea that they are hiding something very true (“back-
stage”) behind their prefabricated roles (“front-stage”). This is a
very personalistic part of the experiment in which agents have the
impression of uncovering the alleged “secret Self,” hidden sphere
of themselves. A young participant’s description demonstrates the
effect of the uncovering of secrecy that has not yet been embod-
ied and enacted: “Up to now I have always controlled myself in
order not to show the truth. But the experiments always brought
me to this point. So this time I followed the impulse and trans-
formed into a child. A child in the uterus. I had my eyes closed,
was lying on the ﬂoor huddled and moved very slightly. I thought
I would stay there forever because it was the most secret Self I
had. But after some time, I do not know how long it took, it
started to be somehow boring. It did not interest me anymore.
It was very surprising for me. I stood up and told the child: it’s
time to be born, don’t you think?” The way in which the utterance
and exposure transform the content of a secret idea is illustrated
by the following example: “When I for the ﬁrst time said loudly
I was stupid and again stupid and stupid, it sounded suddenly
not like the only truth about myself anymore. I had to react
by saying that I objected. The stupid one still insisted on being
stupid and the other ﬁgure tried to tell him it was a nonsense.
The secret truth transformed into a good piece of a dual game.”
A more general view of the relationship between personal engage-
ment and self-differentiation is offered by a third comment: “The
more I am personal in the experiment, the more I see I have many
different aspects or ﬁgures linked to each other. There is noth-
ing like the only true Self. It is rather a dialog among different
agents.”
With respect to the investigation of the mentioned hypothesis
we can note at this stage of the experiment the following:
(A) Participants became aware of a new form of self-alterity in this
stage of experiment. It had the form of front-stage and back-
stage, the image consisting in normative roles and the secret
hidden “true Self.”
(B) As the comments of participants show, once the “true Self”
from back-stage is manifested, it ceases to function as the very
true content of the agent. It transforms into one aspect of an
interaction that calls for an answer. The enactment transforms
the alleged closed mental image into an embodied form of
self-interaction of the agent. This conﬁrms again the enactivist
idea of inexistence of a closed univocal mind that may be sec-
ondarily fully manifested. The sense is always made through
enactment in the world and interaction (De Jaegher and Di
Paolo, 2007, 488).
(C) Thus, once being enacted and embodied, the hidden Self brings
along new performative possibilities hitherto unknown by the
agent, the invisible excess of sense. The enacted baby gives
the agent the active power to stand up on his feet. Exposed
stupidity gives the agent the power to object and form another
ﬁgure. Being personal turns into being multiple.
DISCOVERY OF THE OPAQUE OTHER: SELF-RELATIONAL INVISIBILITY
The fourth stage of the experiment starts approximately after
twelve sessions. With an increasing number of attempts supported
by the increasing trust in the positive feedback from audience,
the participants start not only to orient themselves in the situ-
ation but even to enjoy it in some respect. Enjoyment appears
when the participant begins to get more relaxed, to slow down and
become more curious about what is happening instead of focusing
on oneself and one’s exposure and visibility. This transformation
of focus goes from the alleged hidden self toward miniscule events
that happen to the agent: for instance, a slight motion of ﬁngers,
ideas enrolling in mind, ﬁssure in the wall, sound of steps. These
events can be understood as so-called impulses, as triggers of some
unknown expressive forms that are yet to be. Through the expres-
sive ampliﬁcation, the trigger develops into the so-called ﬁgure,
i.e., a discernible, unequivocal, and complex expression having
clear contours and meaning (for example, a slight motion of the
ﬁngers becomes slowly amotherwaving goodbye toher child going
to school for the ﬁrst time; or a slight motion of ﬁngers becomes
a dancer in a group around a ﬁreplace).
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The following example documents this process very clearly: “I
started with a slight balancing on my feet. I was balancing in this
way until I realized it was like being on a ship. I balanced a lit-
tle bit more and it made me wave to people who, I imagined,
were waving to me. “I will get back soon” I cried out to them.
“Good luck, our hero!” They cried out. (I changed into them
for a while) I waved three more times and then I had a sudden
impression I was completely alone on the open ocean and my
waving is useless. “What shall I now do with this waving hand?”
I asked. But at the same moment the hand was already acting as
a magic animal who tried to bite me. My reaction was to bite
back at the beast. We fought for a moment and then the signal
stopped the play.” This example shows the function of imagina-
tion and playfulness at this stage of experiment. The participant
is not any more concerned by himself personally. He is capa-
ble of following the “logic of the play” that has its own rules.
This capacity includes the readiness to change one’s own stance,
bodily scheme at the right moment of the play. The key skill in
“(Inter)acting with the inner partner” is thus to follow the order
of play, not that of one’s own ﬁxed form. It includes catching
the moment when the intensive expression receives “an answer
from the other side” (Chrz, 2010a, 154). The other side is a name
for an a priori unlocated answer, the emergence of a response
in a situation. The other side does not mean the deeper secret
Self, the alter ego, but the situational opposite, a surprising emer-
gent phenomenon that balances the hitherto monological way of
being and acting (e.g., the change from balancing to waving, from
waving to crying, from crying to reﬂecting, from reﬂecting to
biting).
The other example shows that the dialogical structure can
appear in the discursive form as well: “I was walking in the cir-
cles in the space. After quite a long time I told myself it was too
boring to walk in this way around the room. ‘Can you do some-
thing more interesting, so that I can react on it?’ I asked. ‘No’ was
the response, ‘I am a very boring sophisticated philosopher who
does nothing but walk in a boring way and produce boring ideas.
Do you want to hear some?,’ ‘Yes please’ was the answer ‘it sounds
very attractive in the end. Tell me the most boring one you have.
Are you paid for this sort of thinking? How much do you get?”’
This example shows again that the agent does not identify her-
self with one or the other expressive ﬁgure but follows the dialog
between them. She performs not as an individual agent, but as
dividual agent, i.e., an agent capable of existing as divided, in dif-
ferent aspects/identities. Aspects of this alternation are not more
or less essential among themselves. This playful interaction with
oneself has to have speciﬁc tempo-rhythm so that it does not fade
out or explode. The practitioner should respect the rules of her
own play.
In the third example a participant directly points out the expe-
rience of surprise and fascination. “I walked very slowly in the
space. Everything seemed to me boring. I told it aloud: ‘How the
world is boring. . . nothing happens at all, nothing, nothing.’ But
when I pronounced the word ‘nothing’ it started to interest me
that it can be pronounced as a sound made by a barking dog. It
was extremely surprising to me that I transformed from a bored
IT into a dog, but it gave me so much energy at the same time.
I was fascinated by each sound I pronounced and the situation
began to clarify itself. I was so deeply immersed in the play that I
even misheard the auditory signal.” This example shows that the
subtle sensibility to what already happens in the situation brings
new forms of meaning. The “nothing” was transformed into a
source of meaning that gave the participant “energy” and“fascina-
tion.” These moments are usually very surprising because they are
not a priori given. They accompany the standard utterances and
expressions as their marginal, even invisible aspects.
The audience reaction at this stage of practice is very signiﬁcant.
The creative withdrawal of the participant from her personality
has a paradoxical effect on observers. One observer commented as
follows concerning the ﬁrst example: “She is not speaking of her
own accord, but yes, now she has a sparkle, something that is of
her own. She is attentive and exact.” The other commented: “She
fascinated me by some unknown subtlety.” The second example
was commented on in the following way: “I do not know why, but
his action was suddenly addressing me. It is precise and strong. I
have to think on it intensively.”; “He uncovers something general
in his action that attracts my attention.” The third example was
commented on as follows: “There is something that inﬂuences me,
ﬁxes my attention all the time, a sort of secret that is extremely
powerful.”; “I so much like the moments of subtle concentration
on the play when it happens, when it starts to make sense. I seem
to come alive at this moment and reﬂect on what is going on.”
The“subtlety”very often described bymetaphors as an idiosyn-
cratic “color,” “taste,” “sparkle” of the action is what I wish to
denote as the invisible excess of sense. According to the descrip-
tion of participants, some ungraspable aspect of the action moves
them, fascinates them, makes them attentive and reﬂective. The
opacity of such aspects involves performative force for them. This
excess could even be understood as an artistic dimension of our
expressivity.
This stage of the experiment concurs with both points of the
hypothesis:
(A) Self-interaction at this stage of the practice arises as dialog
among different expressive aspects (ﬁgures) without being
personalistic and without one being prior to the other. The
creative distance from personalistic interpretation of action
discovers the lively ambiguity and non-hierarchical dialog that
produces meaning. To make sense means not to insist on some
ﬁxed identity and closure, but rather to take the situational
counterpart as one’s own potential. Indeed, to make sense
means to change in a consistent way. The lively identity of
a person consists in the possibility of changing alongside the
potential offered by the situation.
(B) The curiosity, playfulness, and relaxed sensibility amplify the
probability of being able to bring into play invisible excess
of meaning present in the situation. The action gains new
dimension of meaning through the fact the agent is fascinated
and not scared by the unknown.
(C) The audience approves of the existence of an excess of mean-
ing,Merleau-Ponty’s“active power of what is being perceived.”
Observers feel fascinated. They perceive the unobvious charac-
ter of actor’s expression and of the situation. The performance
attracts the observers’ attention by a certain power, moves
them and makes them think at the same time.
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EXPERIMENT FOR MORE AGENTS: INTERSUBJECTIVE INVISIBILITY
AND ETHICAL ATTITUDE
The ﬁnal stage of the 1-year experiment consisted in interac-
tion of more participants in the space. The experiment had the
same setting as individual practice, except that now there were
two participants in the space together. Their goal was to establish
mutual contact using the same hints as in the individual prac-
tice (no roles, no eye contact with the audience, relaxed attention,
expression). Due to the fact they all had already had experience
with the practice for quite some time, their interaction had the
character of relaxed and attentive improvisation that took into
consideration the opacity of another human being in the space.
As the following comment shows, participants were able to “give
space” to each other: “The appearance of my colleague brought
into play a new form of opacity. I did not know exactly what
he meant and wanted, but I knew it was necessary to wait for
a while. I made some movements with my hands to indicate
a widening of space. Then he started to sing.” However, they
agree as well that their inner dialogical structure resembles that
of interaction: “For me interacting with another person was not
that different from the individual rehearsal. She was there as I
am for me, as another. I interacted with her as with another
inner partner. She surprised me, which created a good ﬁeld of
energy.”
We can see that participants played alongwith the opacity of the
other without the need to address it directly. This stance includes
the acceptance that there are aspects in social interaction that are
not any of our business, even though they participate in the situa-
tion. This moment raises questions on the ethical attitude toward
the invisibility of the other, or the ethical extent of intersubjective
invisibility.
EXPERIMENT AND REAL SOCIAL INTERACTION
“(Inter)acting with the inner partner” brings people in an experi-
mental situation that is lacking in relative obviousness. In spite
of this, the experiment has direct implications for everyday
intersubjectivity.
(1) By means of the method of phenomenological bracketing of
what is common, one suppresses obvious and habitual pat-
terns in favor of the less obvious but not less important aspect
of creative interaction. This aspect is present in everyday inter-
subjectivity in the moments of surprise, improvisation, loss of
ﬂuency, when the agent is able to work with these moments
creatively and not in a rigid (even neurotic) way. The practice
gives space to investigate the very structure of playfulness in
social interaction.
(2) The situation of public solitude ampliﬁes again amarginal, but
very natural state of self-interaction in solitude. Interacting
with oneself is not an artiﬁcial practice, it is a genuine part
of self-relationship. The practice shows how the patterns of
self-interaction co-arise with patterns of social interaction.
(3) The practice is not only uncovering certain patterns, but it
is transformative as well in terms of emphasizing these pat-
terns in social skills of the participants. Participants developed
during the practice joyful, relaxing, and generous ways of
social interaction. They achieved the capacity of consciously
stepping out of rigid habits and contributing to participa-
tory sense-making through their speciﬁc relaxed concentra-
tion. This concentration enables development and perfor-
mance of surprising, invisible but profound aspects of the
other. Comments collected through interviews demonstrate
it: “‘(Inter)acting with the inner partner’ changed completely
my view of my surroundings. I observe people differently, try
to develop our interaction from other sources, not from the
norms and this sort of stuff”;“When I take themetro, I observe
how people interact when they have little space or when they
are in a hurry. It is very funny to see it as a game. And it is even
funnier if I propose some new way of behavior there, as I once
made something like sport commentary about who will be the
ﬁrst to step into the wagon and people immediately relaxed
and started to laugh”; “Every social situation can be creative.
I feel like a part of a vast network where surprising things
may happen, like gifts from nowhere. They are to be noticed
merely.”
CONCLUSION
I hope to have demonstrated by means of an empirical exem-
pliﬁcation the following conclusion: social interaction includes
elements of opacity and invisibility. These elements play a par-
ticular role in social interaction. This role is performative. This
means that opacity is neither an obstacle to be overcome by
means of a more precise understanding, nor a lack of mean-
ing, but an excess of meaning, a “hiddenness” of the real that
has an “active power” (Merleau-Ponty). The description of the
practice showed that we can sensitize ourselves to the invisi-
ble excess of sense on the physical level, on the level of social
norms, and on those of self-relationship and intersubjective
relationships. Aspects of invisibility are partially described by
the enaction theory and in phenomenology. My goal was to
underline mainly two important aspects of invisibility that have
not yet been developed in detail in participatory sense-making
theory.
The ﬁrst point concerns the self-opacity of each agent of
social interaction and the dividual, dialogical character of her
self-interaction. The self-relationship is characterized as the
ability to see oneself as another. It occurs as an interaction
among non-identical aspects that correspond together on the
basis of a temporal rhythm and the regularity of their dynam-
ics. This observation raises new questions for further research,
especially concerning the autonomy of an agent in social under-
standing. The theory of participatory sense-making proposes
an idea of “multi-dimensional complex of identities that co-
exist in what we call a subject” (De Jaegher and Di Paolo,
2007, 503), but this element has not been developed in detail
in terms of its unity. Instead the autonomy of living sys-
tems is deﬁned as “the property of operational closure” and
“the virtue of their self-generated identity as distinct entities”
(De Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007, 487). Can this deﬁnition of
unity be explained or even shifted toward the self-interaction-
based deﬁnition that includes non-hierarchical multiplicity of
different aspects? May the agent be coherent on the basis of
rhythm of some inner “process,” even “play,” “dialogical order,”
“dividual dynamics” (as opposed to individuality) and exactly
www.frontiersin.org September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 1081 | 9
Koubová Invisible excess of sense in social interaction
as such take part in social interaction? How is the detach-
ment from oneself (inner non-identity) important for human
autonomy?
The second point concerns the invisible excess of sense in social
interaction that represents neither a closed content of disembod-
ied mind nor a clearly embodied expression but still has to be
accepted as source of meaning. The resulting issue that arises
from the idea of existence of invisible excess of sense concerns
the form of the enactive approach to this sort of phenomena.
How do people approach in an appropriate way the opacity of
others? Does the only way consist in understanding the other, in
the effort to catch what the other means, in coordination and
coupling? Should a hint of hidden excess present a trigger for an
attempt to keep asking, to uncover it in interaction, to understand
it better through action? Does the invisibility have only a form of
question, lack of sense that calls for an answer? Can we notice a
certain dimension of silence, peace, pause, shutdown of dynamics
with respect to the element of invisible excess of sense in social
understanding? Enactive ethics (Colombetti and Torrance, 2009)
is usually characterized by the focus on interactive and interper-
sonal dimensions of moral phenomena. This approach allows us
in a most appropriate way to avoid ethical individualism. Within
this very propitious ethical context I wish however, to stress that
social understandingmay also imply a capacity of generous respect
for alterity – stepping back, letting be – which is not passive but
creative.
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